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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to build and analyse a model of unemploy-
ment, where jobs search is open to both natives and migrant workers. Markets and
government intervention respond jointly to unemployment when creating new jobs.
Full employment of resources is the focal point of policy action, stimulating vacancy
creation. We acknowledge that policy is implemented with delays, and capture labour
market outcomes by building a non-linear dynamic system. We observe jobs sepa-
ration and matching, and extend our model to an open economy with migration and
delayed policy intervention meant to reduce unemployment. We analyse the stability
behaviour of the resulting equilibrium for our dynamic system, including models with
Dirac and weak kernels. We simulate our model with alternative scenarios, where
policy action towards jobs creation considers both migration and unemployment, or
just unemployment.
Keywords Unemployment · Dynamic models · Distributed delay · Hopf bifurcation ·
Migration · Matching
1 Introduction
Creating new job opportunities is a priority for any vibrant economy. In the aftermath
of the financial crisis government efforts have primarily focused on containing insta-
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bility and reducing public debt, yet active labour market policies might be needed
to promote employment. New vacancies reduce the number of those registered as
unemployed, but they conceivably attract as well new migrant workers. International
migration can add to the uncertainty in labour market prospects for natives, and easily
translates into a sensitive issue for policy makers to review in times of economic
instability (Facchini and Mayda 2008; Blanchflower and Shadforth 2009; Hatton
2014). Arguably, a successful policy addressing unemployment and that benefits the
economyover time creates employment opportunities for natives, aswell as supporting
migrants. We hence propose to explore the viability of a labour market policy
supporting vacancy creation, where the government acknowledges the simultaneous
search for jobs by natives and new immigrants.
We consider unemployment in migrants destinations as a factor in the latters’ deci-
sion to move. Unemployment levels influence the potential to match migrants with
employment opportunities abroad and it can act as a deterrent to further immigration.
The empirical literature on labour mobility finds a weak and ambiguous relationship
between unemployment and migration (see for a survey of relevant studies Bauer and
Zimmermann 1999; Jean and Jimenez 2011; Angrist and Kugler 2003; Blanchflower
and Shadforth 2009; Damette and Fromentin 2013). Yet, Hatton (2014) concludes
that during an economic slump the increase in unemployment is typically associated
with a decline in immigration. As such, we will accept that migration is declining
where unemployment is on the rise, further reflecting the experience during the recent
economic crisis.
The complex interaction betweenmigration andunemployment over timemotivated
a dynamic model capturing developments in aggregate unemployment for an open
economy.Webuild on insights from job search andmatchingmodels of unemployment
[e.g. Pissarides (2011)] but focus on aggregate flows to and out of unemployment,
alongwithmigration and its labour market impact in an open economy.We analyse the
fluctuation in unemployment in a continuous time framework, as previously proposed
by Shimer (2011) when undertaking empirical tests of US unemployment factors.
We explore more closely the dynamic market interaction between unemployment,
vacancies, employment andmigration, by adding policy intervention to the framework.
Earlier research considering the economic dynamics of migration is rare, but
Camacho (2013) models the decisions of inter-regionally mobile skilled workers and
analyses the steady state stability of a system informedby the neweconomic geography
framework. The paper provided numerical simulations presenting stability trajecto-
ries in the context of different technologies. While also building a dynamic system
and undertaking simulation for an open economy, we depart in this paper from the
individual choices of migrants and focus instead on the aggregate outcomes in terms
of unemployment, with migration a contributing factor.
Our approach is to build a system modelling the dynamics of unemployment and
to question the extent to which the policy framework leads to locally stable outcomes.
The local stability of our system is analysed theoretically under particular conditions,
on the basis of a non-linear dynamic mathematical model with distributed delays.
Earlier economic literature modelling delays in a different decision making context
observes that lack of lags in information, while conventionally a source of stability,
it can also destroy a stable equilibrium (Huang 2008). To test the impact of delays in
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policy reaction we simulate our system under alternative specifications. We observe
a variation in outcomes where migration is built into the policy reaction function and
enhances labour market intervention beyond the usual response to local unemploy-
ment.
Intervention in reaction to particular events has been previously considered by
Nikolopoulos and Tzanetis (2003) who developed a model that looks at housing allo-
cation of homeless families due to a natural disaster. Using concepts from this paper,
Misra and Singh (2011) constructed and analysed nonlinear mathematical models
for the reduction of unemployment. In Misra and Singh (2013), the model is fur-
ther described by a nonlinear dynamic system with delay. Their system includes: the
number of unemployed, the number of employed, and the number of newly created
vacancies through government intervention. There are separations from existing jobs
and posts are being occupied by a proportion of those unemployed, who also bene-
fit from policy induced vacancies creation. A time delay is introduced in the rate of
creation of new vacancies through policy action and a detailed stability analysis is
provided.
Our study is primarily in line with that of Misra and Singh (2011, 2013). The lat-
ter started from a macroeconomic perspective in a developing country and observed
aggregate matching processes and the interaction between unemployment and policy
supported vacancies. We propose to extend the application of this framework to the
case where migrants arrive to look for jobs, and can become unemployed or take
up employment at destination. Our analysis reflects the circumstances in developed
economies that are open to at least some internationally mobile workers. Under condi-
tions similar to the single market operating in the EU there is no direct policy control
over migrant numbers and governments just observe the stock of migrants on their ter-
ritory along with the number of the unemployed. Consequently, any vacancies created
through policy intervention will depend on the number of the unemployed observed
simultaneously with new migrant labour.
In this paper we consider initially a new state variable to supplement the sys-
tem described in Misra and Singh (2013), the total number of jobs on the market.
This variable captures market responses to unemployment and the implicit downward
pressures on wages. Due to the fact that “continuously distributed” delay models are
more realistic (Ruan 1996), we also propose to use a distributed time delay in relation
to both unemployment and migration. We further focus on the number of immigrants
as a variable along with market and policy induced job creation. For the resulting
nonlinear mathematical model we use stability theory of differential equations. We
prove analytically that under some conditions there is a unique positive equilibrium
point. Then, for this equilibrium point, we study the local stability behaviour and we
analyse the influence of the distributed time delay on the stability properties. In this
way, two different kernels are introduced and a detailed analysis is done with respect
to these. For both Dirac and weak kernels we prove that Hopf bifurcation occurs
and a family of periodic solutions bifurcates from the equilibrium when the bifurca-
tion parameter passes through a critical value. This critical value of delay is obtained
analytically.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 the model for unemployment reduction
with migration and two kernels is described. An equilibrium analysis is presented in
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Sect. 3. For different types of kernels a stability analysis is done in Sect. 4. Numerical
simulations are carried out in Sect. 5. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Sect. 6
and the Appendix provides technical details.
2 The Mathematical Model
Wemodel unemployment in a continuous time framework, along with a policy of jobs
creation. The number of individuals claiming unemployment rises over time under the
influence of external factors andwe see this number diminishwhere a proportion of the
unemployed find jobs created by recovering markets or through active labour market
stimulation. Yet, some of those currently in employment might also be dismissed and
job losses increase unemployment, along with the arrival of migrants who cannot
find a job at destination. Finally, some of the unemployed can also leave or retire,
diminishing the numbers of those in need of support through job creation. The change
in unemployment is captured in Eq. (1).
In themodelling process, we consider that all individuals are qualified to do any job.
At any time t , the number of unemployed persons, U (t), changes by an autonomous
factor a1. The instantaneous rate of movement from unemployment to employment is
jointly proportional toU (t) and the number of available vacancies P(t)+V (t)−E(t),
where P(t) is the total number of jobs on the market, V (t) is the total number of
newly created vacancies through government intervention and E(t) is the number of
employed individuals.
Migrants are attracted to a particular labour market by a mixture of economic and
non-economic factors. Persistently large income differentials between migrants’ typi-
cal origins and destination countries mean an ongoing inflow of workers from abroad,
ready to enter the labour market of our observed economy. The stock of migrants
typically increases, often through the attractiveness of social networks and translating
into an autonomous rise of migrant stocks, independent of economic conditions. Yet
migrants’ attraction to a labour market is a function of their employability, which
depends on the available jobs in the destination economy. Migrants can also benefit
from access to newly created vacancies. By entering employment abroad, immigrants
become part of the labour force at destination, rising the number of total employed
individuals in the economy. Foreign workers can also be expected to register as job-
less, ultimately increasing the numbers claiming unemployment benefits. On the other
hand, return migration often represents a significant proportion of the initial migrants,
diminishing the migrant stock along with natural attrition. Such developments are
captured by Eq. (2).
In the model, the number of immigrants that become part of the active labour force
at destination at time t is denoted by M(t). It is assumed that migration increases
by an autonomous amount m1. The rate of instantaneous movement of immigrants
into employment m2 is jointly proportional to M(t) and the number of available jobs
P(t) + V (t) − E(t). The proportion of migrants who register as unemployed is a5 .
The number of individuals in employment rises through the job findings of the
unemployed and migrant workers occupying market created jobs and vacancies
supported through government intervention. Total employment decreases as a con-
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sequence of either retirement or natural loss, along with a number of workers losing
jobs, or moving into unemployment.
This is expressed formally in (3), reflecting in the first two factors of the equation
the move from unemployment or migration to employment. These are processes com-
plementary to those described in model (1) and (2). The rate at which the employed
are separating from their jobs is a4.
The death rates of the unemployed, employed and immigrants are a3, m3 and b1.
Our system also captures the fact that government supports vacancies creation with
the purpose to bring down unemployment and make better use of available human
resources. There is no discrimination between natives and migrants in accessing new
jobs, whether these are created by the market or through policy intervention. Both
unemployment and migrant numbers are observed by the government and these num-
bers shape future intervention. Vacancies creation takes place with a delay, influenced
by the process of making reliable data available, and the time needed for a policy
response to be formulated. Equation (4) captures the active labour market policy sup-
porting new vacancies, with different delays in the reaction to observed unemployment
or migration.
The distributed time delay is introduced in the terms
∫ ∞
0 k1(d1, s)U (t − s)ds and∫ ∞
0 k2(d2, s)M(t − s)ds, where k1(d1, s) with d1 > 0 and k2(d2, s) with d2 > 0, are
called “kernels” (Bernard et al. 2001). These represent density functions of the delays.
We also consider that there is variation over time in the jobs created by the market,
depending on unemployment and implicit wage pressures associated with decreasing
unemployment. This is expressed in Eq. (5).
The change over time in the number of jobs created by the market P(t) is propor-
tional to U (t) and we add a jobs depreciation rate of c2.
In view of the above considerations, the problem of unemployment reduction with
migration and distributed delays may be written as follows:
U˙ (t) = a1 − a2U (t)(P(t) + V (t) − E(t)) − a3U (t) + a4E(t) + a5M(t), (1)
M˙(t) = m1 − m2M(t)(P(t) + V (t) − E(t)) − (a5 + m3)M(t), (2)
E˙(t) = a2U (t)(P(t) + V (t) − E(t)) + m2M(t)(P(t) + V (t) − E(t))
−(b1 + a4)E(t), (3)
V˙ (t) = e1
∫ ∞
0
k1(d1, s)U (t − s)ds + e3
∫ ∞
0
k2(d2, s)M(t − s)ds − e2V (t),
(4)
P˙(t) = c1U (t) − c2P(t). (5)
where ai , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, b1, ci , i = 1, 2, 3, d, d1, d2, ei , i = 1, 2, 3, mi , i = 1, 2, 3
are real positive numbers.
InEq. (4), the functions k1(d1, s), k2(d2, s), are definedby ki (di , ·) : [0,∞) → R+,
i = 1, 2 and satisfy the conditions:
1. ki (di , s)Δs represents the probability of the event of occurrence of delay between
s and s + Δs. That is, ki (di , s) satisfies the following:
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ki (di , s) ≥ 0,
∫ ∞
0
ki (di , s)ds = 1,
∫ ∞
0
ski (di , s)ds = E (di ), s ∈ [0,∞), di > 0, i = 1, 2 (6)
where E (di ) is the expectation of the distributed delay.
2. As the variable s tends to infinity, it is rapidly decreasing or its support is compact.
In what follows, we consider the following types of expressions for ki (di , s)
(Bernard et al. 2001):
1. The weak kernel
k(d, s) = de−ds, d > 0 (7)
From (6) we have E (d) = 1
d
.
2. The Dirac kernel
k(τ, s) = δ(s − τ), τ > 0, (8)
where δ(s − τ) is the Dirac distribution. From (6) we have E (τ ) = τ .
If ki (di , s), i = 1, 2, have the form (7), then Eq. (4) is given by
V˙ (t) = e1d1
∫ ∞
0
e−d1sU (t − s)ds + e3d2
∫ ∞
0
e−d2s M(t − s)ds − e2V (t). (9)
If k(τi , s) are given by (8), then Eq. (4) is given by
V˙ (t) = e1U (t − τ1) + e3M(t − τ2) − e2V (t).
If k1(d1, s) has the form (7) and k2(τ2, s) is given by (8), Eq. (4) is given by
V˙ (t) = e1d1
∫ ∞
0
e−d1sU (t − s)ds + e3M(t − τ2) − e2V (t). (10)
In the following we analyse the model (1)–(5) using the stability theory of the
differential equation with distributed delay. We find the region of attraction given in
the form of the following lemma:
Lemma The set
Ω =
{
(U, M, E, V, P) : 0≤U+M+E ≤ a1+m1
δ
,
0 ≤ V ≤ (e1+e3)(a1+m1)
δe2
, 0 ≤ P ≤ c1(a1 + m1)
δc2
}
(11)
where δ = min(a3, b1,m3) is a region of attraction for the system (1)–(5) and it
attracts all solutions initiating in the interior of the positive octant.
Proof See Appendix 1.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
The non-negative equilibrium E0(x10, x20, x30, x40, x50) is obtained by solving the
following system:
a1 − a2x1(x5 + x4 − x3) − a3x1 + a4x3 + a5x2 = 0 (12)
m1 − m2x2(x5 + x4 − x3) − (a5 + m3)x2 = 0 (13)
a2x1(x5 + x4 − x3) + m2x2(x5 + x4 − x3) − (b1 + a4)x3 = 0 (14)
e1x1 + e3x2 − e2x4 = 0 (15)
c1x1 − c2x5 = 0 (16)
From (12)–(14), we obtain:
a1 + m1 − a3x1 − m3x2 − b1x3 = 0. (17)
From (15)–(16), we have:
x4 = e1x1 + e3x3
e2
, x5 = c1x1
c2
, x3 = a1 + m1 − a3x1 − m3x2
b1
. (18)
From (18), we get:
x4 + x5 − x3 = ab1x1 + bb1x2 − (a1 + m1)
b1
(19)
where
a = c1
c2
+ e1
e2
+ a3
b1
, b = e3
e2
+ m3
b1
. (20)
From (19) and (12), we get:
Hα := α20x21 + α11x1x2 − α10x1 + α01x2 − α00 = 0, (21)
Hβ := β02x22 + β11x1x2 − β01x2 − β00 = 0, (22)
where
α20 = a2b1a, α11 = a2b1b,
α10 = a2(a1 + m1) − a3(b1 + a4),
α01 = a5b1 − a4m3, α00 = a1b1 + a4(a1 + m1),
β02 = m2b1b, β11 = m2b1a,
β01 = m2(a1 + m1) − b1(a3 + a5),
β00 = m1b1.
(23)
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Equations (21) and (22) represent the equations of two hyperboles. The hyperbole
Hα has the center Cα
(
α01
α11
,
α11α10 − 2α20α01
α211
)
and the asymptotes x1 = α01
α11
and
x2 + α11α10 − 2α20α01
α211
= −a
b
(
x1 − α01
α11
)
.
The hyperbola Hβ has the center Cβ
(
β01
β11
, 0
)
and the asymptotes x1 = 0, x2 =
−a
b
(
x1 − β01
β11
)
.
A necessary condition, as the hyperboles Hα , Hβ have a commonpointwith positive
coordinates, is that the coordinates of the centers are positive and
a
b
> 1. Thus, we
have the conditions:
a > b, bα10 > 2aα01,m2aα01 < a2bβ01. (24)
Now, we determine the equation which determines the coordinate x10 of the inter-
section point.
From (21), we get:
x2 = α00 + α10x1 − α20x
2
1
α11x1 − α01 . (25)
From (25), (22), we have:
γ3x
3
1 + γ2x21 + γ1x1 + γ0 = 0 (26)
with
γ3 = α10α11β11 − α20 (β11α01 + α11β01) ,
γ2 = α00α11β11 − β02α210 + α10(β11α01 + α11β01)
+ α20α01β01 + β00α211,
γ1 = −2β02α00α10 − α01α10β01
+ α00(β11α01 + α11β01) − 2β00α11α01,
γ0 = β00α201 − α00(β02α00 + β01α01)
(27)
Proposition 1 If
a > b, bα10 > 2aα01,m2aα01 < a2bβ01
γ3 > 0, γ2 > 0, γ1 < 0, γ0 < 0,
(28)
then the non-negative equilibrium E0 has the coordinates:
x20 = α00 + α10x10 − α20x
2
10
α11x10 − α01 ,
x30 = a1 + m1 − a3x10 − m3x20
b1
,
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x40 = e1x10 + e3x20
e2
, x50 = c1x10
c2
, (29)
where x10 is the positive solution of Eq. (26).
Proof See Appendix 2.
Using the transformation u1(t) = U (t) − x10, u2(t) = M(t) − x20, u3(t) =
E(t) − x30, u4(t) = V (t) − x40, u5(t) = P(t) − x50, system (1)–(5) becomes:
u˙1(t) = − (α3 + a3)u1(t) + a5u2(t) + (α1 + a4)u3(t) − α1u4(t) − α1u5(t)
− a2u1(t)(u5(t) + u4(t) − u3(t)),
u˙2(t) = − (α4 + a5 + m3)u2(t) + α2u3(t) − α2u4(t) − α2u5(t)
− m2u2(t)(u5(t) + u4(t) − u3(t)),
u˙3(t) = α3u1(t) − α4u2(t) − (α1 + α2 + b1 + a4)u3(t) + (α1 + α2)u4(t)
+ (α1+α2)u5(t)+a2u1(t)(u5(t)+u4(t)
− u3(t))+m2u2(t)(u5(t)+u4(t)−u3(t)),
u˙4(t) = e1
∫ ∞
0
k1(d1, s)u1(t − s)ds + e3
∫ ∞
0
k2(d2, s)u2(t − s)ds − e2u4(t),
u˙5(t) = c1u1(t) − c2u5(t),
(30)
where
α1 = a2x10, α2 = m2x20, α3 = a2(x50 + x40 − x30),
α4 = m2(x50 + x40 − x30). (31)
The system (30) is given by:
u˙(t) = Au(t) +
∫ ∞
0
K (d1, d2, s)u(t − s)ds + F(u(t)) (32)
where
u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t), u3(t), u4(t), u5(t))T , (33)
A =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
a11 a12 a13 −α1 −α1
0 a22 α2 −α2 −α2
α3 −α4 0 a34 a35
0 0 0 −e2 0
c1 0 0 0 −c2
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(34)
where
a11 = −α3 − a3, a12 = a5, a22 = −α4 − a5 − m3,
a13 = α1+a4, a33 =−α1−α2−b1−a4, a34 = α1+α2, a35 = α1 + α2,
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K (d1, d2, s) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
e1k1(d1, s) e3k2(d2, s) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(35)
F(u(t)) = (F1(u(t)), F2(u(t)), F3(u(t)), 0, 0)T with
F1(u(t)) = −a2u1(t)(u5(t) + u4(t) − u3(t)),
F2(u(t)) = −m2u2(t)(u5(t) + u4(t) − u3(t)),
F3(u(t)) = −F1(u(t)) − F2(u(t)).
(36)
4 Stability Analysis
In this section, we study the local stability behaviour of the non-negative equilibrium
E0, in both the cases of no distributed delay and distributed delay.
Using the matrices A and K (d1, d2, s) from (34) and (35), the characteristic equa-
tion of the linearised system (30) is as follows:
Q3(λ) + Q1(λ)
∫ ∞
0
k1(d1, s)e
−λsds + Q2(λ)
∫ ∞
0
k2(d2, s)e
−λsds = 0, (37)
where Q3(λ) = λ5 + q34λ4 + q33λ3 + q32λ2 + q31λ + q30,
Q2(λ) = q23λ3 + q22λ2 + q21λ + q20,
Q1(λ) = q13λ3 + q12λ2 + q11λ + q10,
(38)
where
q34 = c2 + e2 − a11 − a22 − a33,
q33 = c1α1 + e2c2 − (c2 + e2)(a11 + a22 + a33) + a22a33 + a11(a22 + a33)
− a13α3 + α2α4
q32 = e1e2α1 − c1(α1(a22 + a33) + a13a35 − α2a12) − e2c2(a11 + a22 + a33)
+ (c2 + e2)(a22a33 + a11(a22 + a33) − a13α3 + α2α4)
− a11a22a33 − α2α3a12 + α3a13a22
−α2α4a11,
q31 = −e1e2(α1(a22 + a33) + a13a35 − α2a12) + c1(−a12a35α2 − α2α4a13
+α1a22a33 + α1α2α4 + a13a22a35 − α2a12a33)
+ e2c2(a22a33 + a11(a22 + a33) − a13α3
+α2α4) + (c2 + e2)(−a11a22a33 − α2α3a12 + α3a13a22 − α2α4a11)
q30 = c1c2(−a12a32α2 − α2α4a13 + α1a22a33 + α1α2α4 + a13a22a35 − α2a12a33)
+ e2c2(−a11a22a33 − α2α3a12 + α3a13a22 − α2α4a11),
q23 = −e3d2,
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q22 = −e3c2α2 + e3α2(a11 + a33) + e3α2a34,
q21 = e3c2α2(a11 + a33 + α2a34) − e3α2a11a34 + e3α2α3a13 − e3α1α2α3
− e2α2a11a33,
q20 = e3c1(α2a13 − α1α2)(a35 − a34) + e3c2(−α2a11a34 + α2α3a13 − α1α2α3
−α2a11a33)
q13 = e1α1,
q12 = α1e1c2 − e1(α1(a22 + a33) + a13a34 − α2a12)
q11 = −e1c2(α1(a22 + a33) + a13a34 − α2a12) + e1(−a12a34α2 − a13α2α4
+α1a22a33 + α1α2α4 + a13a34a22 − α2a12a33)
q10 = e2c2(−a12a34α2 − a13α2α4 + α1a22a33 + α1α2α4 + a13a34a22 − α2a12a33).
(39)
Proposition 2 If there is no effect of distributed delay, that is when E = 0, the
equilibrium point E0 given by (29) is locally asymptotically stable if and only if the
following conditions hold:
A1 > 0, A5 > 0, A1A2 − A3 > 0,
A1A2A3 − A23 − A21A4 > 0,
(A3A4−A2A5)(A1A2−A3)−(A1A4−A5)2 > 0,
(40)
where A1 = q34, A2 = q13 +q23 +q33, A3 = q12 +q22 +q32, A4 = q11 +q21 +q31,
A5 = q10 + q20 + q30.
Proof See Appendix 3.
We analyse (37) in the case when the expectation of distributed delay is Ei (di ) = 0,
di > 0, i = 1, 2, d1 = d2.
Theorem 1 Suppose that q30 − q20 − q01 < 0 and the conditions from (40) hold.
Then the characteristic equation
λ5 + q34λ4 + q33λ3 + q32λ2 + q31λ + q30
+(q13 + q23)λ3+(q12 + q22)λ2+(q11 + q21)λ
+ (q10 + q20)
∫ ∞
0
k(d1, s)e
−λsds=0
(41)
has a simple pair of conjugate purely imaginary roots ±iω with some expectation
E1(d1).
Proof See Appendix 4.
1. If both kernels are Dirac ki (τi , s) = δ(s−τi ), τi > 0, i = 1, 2 with τ1 = τ2 = τ ,
the characteristic Eq. (41) is
λ5 + q34λ4 + q33λ3 + q32λ2 + q31λ + q30
+ (q13 + q23)λ3 + (q12 + q22)λ2 + (q11 + q21)λ + (q10 + q20)e−λτ = 0.
(42)
Using the method from Mircea et al. (2011) we have:
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Theorem 2 Suppose that the conditions (40) and q30 − q20 − q10 < 0 hold. Then,
Eq. (42) has a simple pair of conjugate purely imaginary roots ±iω0, where ω0 is a
positive root of Eq. (71). For ω0, we have:
τ0 = 1
ω0
arccos
(
(q32ω
2
0 − q34q30ω40)(q10 + q20 − (q11 + q22)ω20)
(q10 + q20 − (q12 + q22)ω20)2((q11 + q21)ω0 − (q13 + q23)ω30)2
+ (ω
5
0 + q33ω30 − q31ω0)((q11 + q21)ω0 − (q12 + q23)ω30)
(q10 + q20 − (q12 + q22)ω20)2 + ((q11 + q21)ω0 − (q13 + q23)ω30)2
+ 2nπ
)
,
n = 0, 1, 2, . . .
(43)
Taking into account that
∫ ∞
0 k1(τ, s)e
−λsds = e−λτ and using Theorem 1 we
obtain Theorem 2.
From Theorem 2, we obtain:
Theorem 3 Suppose the conditions (40) and q30 − q20 − q10 < 0 hold. Then, we
have:
1. If τ ∈ [0, τ0), then the equilibrium point E0 is locally asymptotically stable;
2. If the condition
Re
(
(5λ4 + 4q34λ3 + 3q33λ2 + 2q32λ + q31)eλτ
λ((q13 + q23)λ3 + (q12 + q22)λ2 + (q11 + q21)λ + q10 + q20)
+ 3(q13 + q23)λ
2 + 2(q12 + q22)λ + q11 + q21
λ((q13 + q23)λ3 + (q12 + q22)λ2 + (q11 + q21)λ + q10 + q20)
) ∣
∣
∣
∣
λ=iω0,τ=τ0
= 0
(44)
holds, then in (32) the Hopf bifurcation occurs when τ = τ0.
Proof See Appendix 5.
Remark If Eq. (71) has r0 = q230 − (q10 +q20)2 > 0 and does not have positive roots,
then the equilibrium point E0 is locally asymptotically stable for all τ ≥ 0.
2. If both kernels are weak ki (di , s) = di e−di s , d1 = d2 > 0, then the characteristic
equation (41) becomes:
λ6 + A1λ5 + A2λ4 + A3λ3 + A4λ2 + A5λ + A6 = 0, (45)
where
A1 = q34 + d1, A2 = q33 + d1q34,
A3 = q32 + d1(q13 + q23 + q33),
A4 = q31 + d1(q12 + q22 + q32),
A5 = q30 + d1(q11 + q21 + q31), A6 = d1(q10 + q20 + q30).
(46)
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In what follows we consider:
D1(d1) := A1A2 − A3,
D2(d1) := A1A2A3 + A1A5 − A23 − A4A21,
D3(d1) := A1(A1A3A4 + A1A2A6 + A4A5
− A3A6 − A1A24 − A5A22)
− (A23A4 + A25 − A1A4A5 − A2A3A5),
D4(d1) := A5D3(d1) − A6
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
A1 1 0 0
A3 A2 A1 0
A5 A4 A3 A1
0 A6 A5 A3
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
,
D5(d1) := A6D4(d1).
(47)
Proposition 4 If the conditions D1(d1) > 0, D2(d1) > 0, D3(d1) > 0, D4(d1) > 0,
D5(d1) > 0 hold, for any d1 > 0, the equilibrium point E0 of system (1)–(5) is locally
asymptotically stable.
The proof follows using the Routh–Hurwicz criteria for (45).
In what follows we consider the case k1(τ1, s) = δ(s − τ1), k2(τ2, s) = δ(s − τ2),
with τ1 = 0, τ2 = 0.
Equation (37) becomes:
Q3(λ) + Q1(λ)e−λτ1 + Q2(λ)e−λτ2 = 0, (48)
where Q1, Q2, Q3 are given by (38).
For analysing Eq. (48) we consider the following subcases:
Case 1. τ1 = 0, τ2 = 0
In this case, eq. (48) becomes:
Q3(λ) + Q2(λ) + Q1(λ)e−λτ1 = 0. (49)
Considering λ = iω1 in (49) and separating the real and the imaginary parts we
have:
q34ω
4
1 − (q22 + q32)ω21 + q20 + q30
= (q12ω21 − q10)cos(ω1τ1) + (q13ω31 − q11ω1)sin(ω1τ1),
ω51 − (q23 + q33)ω31 + (q21 + q31)ω1
= (q13ω31 − q11ω1)cos(ω1τ1) − (q12ω21 − q10)sin(ω1τ1).
(50)
From (50), we have:
ω101 + p8ω81 + p6ω61 + p4ω41 + p2ω21 + p0 = 0, (51)
where
p8 = q234 − 2(q23 + q23).
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p6 = (q23 + q33)2 + 2(q21 + q31) − 2q34(q22 + q32) − q213,
p4 = (q22 + q32)2 + 2q34(q20 + q30) − 2(q23 + q33)(q21 + q31) − q212 + 2q13q11,
p2 = (q21 + q31)2 − 2(q22 + q32)(q20 + q30) + 2q12q10,
p0 = (q20 + q30)2 − q210. (52)
Proposition 5 Suppose that the conditions (40) and q20 + q30 − q10 < 0 hold. Then,
Eq. (49) has a simple pair of conjugate purely imaginary roots ±iω01, where ω01 is a
positive root of Eq. (51). For ω01 we have:
τ01 = 1
ω01
{
arccos
[ (
q13ω
2
01 − q11ω01
) (
q34ω
3
01 − (q22 + q32)ω201 + q20 + q30
)
+
(
q12ω
2
01 − q10
) (
ω501 − (q23 + q33)ω301 + (q21 + q31)ω01
)((
q12ω
2
01 − q10
)2
+
(
q13ω
3
01 − q11ω01
)2
)]}
+ 2nπ, n = 0, 1, ....
(53)
From Proposition 5, we obtain:
Proposition 6 Suppose conditions (40) and q20 +q30 −q10 < 0 hold. Then, we have:
1. If τ1 ∈ [0, τ01], then the equilibrium point E0 is locally asymptotically stable;
2. If the condition
Re
(
(5λ4 + 4q34λ3 + 3(q23 + q33)λ2 + 2(q22 + q32)λ + q21 + q31)eλτ1
λ(q13λ3 + q12λ2 + q11λ + q10)
+ 3λ
2 + 2q12λ + q11
λ(q13λ3 + q12λ2 + q11λ + q10)
)
|λ=iω01,τ1=τ10 = 0
(54)
holds,
then in (49) the Hopf bifurcation occurs when τ1 = τ01.
The proof can be done in a similar way as for Theorem 3.
Case 2. Let τ ∗1 ∈ [0, τ10) fixed and τ2 = 0. We determine the value τ20 > 0, τ20(τ ∗1 )
so that equation:
Q3(λ) + Q1(λ)e−λτ∗1 + Q2(λ)e−λτ2 = 0 (55)
admits the roots λ2(τ2) = ±iω2(τ2(τ1)).
We use the following notation:
A(ω2) =
(
q34ω
4
2 − q32ω22 + q30
) (
q10 − q12ω22
)
−
(
ω52 + q33ω32 − q31ω2
) (
q11ω2 − q13ω32
)
,
B(ω2) =
(
q34ω
4
2 − q32ω22 + q30
) (
q11ω2 − q13ω32
)
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Fig. 3 The trajectories of vacancies created through government intervention when there is no delay and
vacancies are supported as policy makers observe both unemployment and migration, e3 = 0.5
+
(
ω52 + q33ω32 − q1ω2
) (
q10 − q12ω22
)
, (56)
C(ω2) = 1
2
[(
q22ω
2
2 − q20
)2 +
(
q23ω
2
2 − q21ω2
)2 −
(
q34ω
4
2 − q32ω22
)2
−
(
ω52 + q23ω22 − q31ω2
)2 −
(
q10 − q12ω22
)2 −
(
q11ω2 − q13ω32
)2]
E1(ω2) = q34ω42 − q32ω22 + q30 +
(
q10 − q12ω22
)
cos(ω2τ
∗
1 )
+
(
q11ω2 − q13ω32
)
sin(ω2τ
∗
1 ), (57)
E2(ω2) = ω52 + q33ω32 − q31ω2 −
(
q11ω2 − q13ω32
)
cos(ω2τ
∗
1 )
+
(
q11 − q12ω22
)
sin(ω2τ
∗
1 ).
Proposition 7 Suppose conditions (40) and q20 + q30 − q10 < 0 hold. Consider
τ ∗1 ∈ [0, τ10), where τ10 is given by (53). Let ω20 be a positive solution of
F(ω2) := A(ω2)cos(ω2τ ∗1 ) + B(ω2)sin(ω2τ ∗1 ) − C(ω2) = 0 (58)
and τ20 is given by:
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Fig. 6 The trajectories of vacancies created through government intervention when there is no delay and
vacancies are supported as policy makers observe unemployment only, e3 = 0
τ20 = 1
ω20
[
arccos
(
E1(ω20)(q22ω220 − q20) − E2(ω20)(q23ω220 − q21ω21)
(
q22ω220 − q20
)2 + (q23ω220 − q21ω21
)2
)
+ 2nπ
]
,
n = 0, 1, 2, . . .
(59)
The value τ2 = τ20 is a Hopf bifurcation. For τ2 ∈ [0, τ20) the equilibrium point
E0 is locally asymptotically stable. For τ2 > τ20 the equilibrium point E0 is unstable.
If τ2 = τ20 the given system has a limit cycle in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium
point.
In what follows we study the case k1(d1, s) = d1e−d1s and k2(d1, s) = d2e−d2s ,
with d1 > 0, d2 > 0.
Equation (37) becomes:
Q3(λ) + Q1(λ) d1
λ + d1 + Q2(λ)
d2
λ + d2 = 0, (60)
where Q1, Q2, Q3 are given by (38).
From (60) with (38) we obtain the equation:
λ7 + B6λ6 + B5λ5 + b4λ4 + B3λ3 + B2λ2 + B1λ + B0 = 0, (61)
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Fig. 9 Periodic orbit for vacancies through government intervention due to Hopf bifurcation take place
when the bifurcation parameter τ passes the critical value τ0 = 90, both kernels are Dirac and equal, and
vacancies are supported as policy makers observe both unemployment and migration, e3 = 0.5
where
B6 = q34 + d1 + d2, B5 = q33 + (d1 + d2)q34 + d1d2,
B4 = q34 + q32 + (d1 + d2)q33 + d1q13 + d2q23,
B3 = q31 + q32(d1 + d2) + d1d2(q33 + q23 + q13) + d1q12 + d2q22,
B2 = (d1 + d2)q31 + d1d2(q12 + q22 + q32) + d2q21 + q11d11,
B1 = (d1 + d2)q30 + d1d2(q32 + q21 + q11) + d1q10 + d2q20,
B0 = d1d2(q30 + q20 + q10).
(62)
We consider:
D1 = B1, D2 = B1B2 − B0B3, D3 =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
B1 B0 0
B3 B2 B1
B5 B4 B3
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
D4 =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
B1 B0 0 0
B3 B2 B1 B0
B5 B4 B3 B2
1 B6 B5 B4
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
, D5 =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
B1 B0 0 0 0
B3 B2 B1 B0 0
B5 B4 B3 B2 B1
1 B6 B5 B4 B3
0 0 1 B6 B5
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
,
D6 =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
B1 B0 0 0 0 0
B3 B2 B1 B0 0 0
B5 B4 B3 B2 B1 B0
1 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2
0 0 1 B6 B5 B4
0 0 0 0 1 B0
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
.
(63)
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Fig. 12 The trajectory of vacancies through government intervention, when both kernels are Dirac and
equal, and vacancies are supported as policy makers observe unemployment only, e3 = 0
Proposition 8 If conditions D1 > 0, D2 > 0, D3 > 0, D4 > 0, D5 > 0, D6 > 0
hold for any di > 0, i=1,2, the equilibrium point E0 of system (1)–(5) is locally
asymptotically stable.
5 Numerical Simulations and Discussions
In the next step we will simulate the outcome of the system choosing parameters
informed by the economic literature, and specific delays. We present results where
policy responds to both unemployment and migration, illustrating the behaviour of
the system introduced theoretically. We further compare an outcome of our system
in which we let government disregard migrant numbers in its policy reaction, with
the more comprehensive approach in which policy responds to unemployment and
migration alike.
For the numerical simulation we consider the following data: a1 = 500, a2 =
0.00004, a3 = 0.04, a4 = 0.004, a5 = 0.1, m1 = 300, m2 = 0.00002, m3 = 0.05,
b1 = 0.006, c1 = 0.08, c2 = 0.3, e1 = 0.04, e2 = 0.008.
First, we simulate the situation where there are no delays in the system, and both
migration and unemployment are factored into the promotion of vacancies.
If there is no delay, the conditions from Proposition 2 hold. Therefore the equi-
librium point is locally asymptotically stable. In Figs. 1, 2 and 3, we can visualise
the evolution of unemployment, employment, migration, market jobs and vacancies
created through government intervention.
Next, we consider a case where vacancies are supported on the observation by
policy makers of unemployment alone, disregarding the fact that migrants can take
up some newly created jobs. Under this scenario, with no delays in the system and
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Fig. 15 Periodic orbit for vacancies through government intervention due to Hopf bifurcation take place
when τ10 = 90 and the bifurcation parameter τ2 passes the critical value τ20 = 95, when both kernels are
Dirac, and vacancies are supported as policy makers observe both unemployment and migration, e3 = 0.5
e3 = 0, we present the orbits of unemployment, employment, migration, market jobs
and vacancies through government intervention in Figs. 4, 5 and 6.
We would like to make a few interesting observations with respect to the simulated
outcomes (over the same time framework), in particularwith respect to unemployment.
While unemployment declines for a little while in both scenarios, we have a much
smaller initial decline in unemployment where migration is ignored in Fig. 4, and a
much stronger rise in unemployment over time. The better outcome in unemployment
levels in Fig. 1 is sustained through the ongoing action by policy makers where they
take migration into account, whereas the government support for new vacancies is
gradually reduced in the alternative scenario of Fig. 6. The market addition of a larger
number of jobs where government ignores migration in Fig. 5 partly compensates for
the lower number of vacancies supported through intervention. Yet, this is not enough
to bring unemployment down to the level observed where the government considered
migration in its policy formulation (see Fig. 1 vs. Fig. 4). Hence, we can conclude that
where unemployment is the main target of policy and migration is part of the system,
unemployment levels are much higher should policy ignore the inflow of migrant
workers searching jobs along with natives.
We shall concentrate next on the simulation of our model where government
responds, with a delay, to both unemployment and migration. If both kernels are Dirac
ki (τi , s) = δ(s − τi ) with τ1 = τ2 = τ , according to Theorem 3, there exists a Hopf
bifurcation for τ0 = 90 and a limit cycle. In Fig. 7, 8 and 9 the orbits of unemployment,
employment, migration, market jobs and vacancies through government intervention
are displayed.
In the same scenario with both kernels Dirac ki (τi , s) = δ(s − τi ), τ1 = τ2 = τ ,
we simulate the case when vacancies are supported on the observation by policy mak-
ers of unemployment alone, e3 = 0. In Figs. 10, 11 and 12 we have the orbits of
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Fig. 18 The trajectories of vacancies through government intervention, when both kernels are weak with
d1 = 0.05, d2 = 0.04 and vacancies are supported as policy makers observe both unemployment and
migration, e3 = 0.5
unemployment, employment, migration, market jobs and vacancies through govern-
ment intervention. They converge to the asymptotically stable equilibrium point. We
emphasise that having ignored migration, policy intervention this time around results
in a stable outcome.
We find that if both kernels are Dirac k1(τ1, s) = δ(s − τ1), k2(τ2, s) = δ(s − τ2),
due to Proposition 7, then there exists a Hopf bifurcation for τ20 = 95, when τ10 = 90.
If τ2 = τ20, there exists a limit cycle. In Figs. 13, 14 and 15 we can notice that the
orbits of unemployment, employment, migration, market jobs and vacancies through
government intervention all oscillate.
Finally, to further illustrate the system behaviour under an alternative specification
we simulate the system with weak kernels in policy responses to both migration and
unemployment. If both kernels are weak k1(d1, s) = d1e−d1s , k2(d2, s) = d2e−d2s ,
with d1 = 0.05, d2 = 0.04, the equilibrium point is locally asymptotically stable due
to Proposition 8. Figures 16, 17 and 18 show the orbits of unemployment, employment,
migration, market jobs and vacancies through government intervention.
We notice that the numerical simulations in Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14 and 15 verify the theoretical findings of Sect. 4.
6 Conclusions
The paper developed and analysed a model for unemployment reduction where ongo-
ing migration takes place. This is described by a nonlinear differential system with
distributed time delay. At any time t , we take into account five variables: the number
of unemployed individuals, the number of employed individuals, the number of new
immigrants, the number of total jobs on themarket, and the number of vacancies newly
created through government intervention.
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For the unique positive equilibrium point we study the local asymptotic stability
according to distributed time delays. In absence of delay the equilibrium point is
locally asymptotically stable under some conditions of the parameters.
We have tested the significance of taking migration into account when formulating
policy to address unemployment. We thus observed the evolution of unemployment,
employment, migration, market jobs and government supported vacancies with two
alternative policy approaches. In a first instance we have simulated the system in the
case where policy aims to reduce unemployment by observing both past values of
unemployment and migration. In the second instance policy supports jobs creation by
taking into account past unemployment alone. Where migrants are taken into account
by the policy, a more significant drop is registered in initial levels of unemployment
and a lower level of unemployment results over time. In the second scenario where
government ignores migration, unemployment quickly returns to a relatively high
value after a small dip.
In the case of Dirac kernels it is proved that there is a Hopf bifurcation and the
stable equilibrium becomes unstable as delay crosses some critical values. Yet, where
the kernels are equal and government ignores migration, policy intervention results in
a stable outcome.
Where both kernels are weak, under some conditions of parameters, the equilibrium
point is locally asymptotically stable.
Our theoretical findings are tested in a set of simulations including locally asymp-
totic stable outcomes and limit cycles.
For the numerical simulationsweusedMaple 17 andMatlab and thefigures obtained
verify the theoretical statements.
For the uniform distribution and the strong kernel, a similar analysis will be carried
out in a further paper. Also, the direction of the Hopf bifurcation can be analysed. As
in Mircea et al. (2011) the stochastic approach will be taken into consideration.
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Appendix 1: The Proof of Lemma
From (1)–(3) we obtain:
d
dt
(U (t) + M(t) + E(t)) = a1 + m1 − a3U (t) − m3M(t) − b1E(t) (64)
which leads to
d
dt
(U (t)+M(t) + E(t)) ≤ a1 + m1 − δm(U (t) + M(t) + E(t))
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Taking the supremum limit, we obtain:
lim sup
t→∞
[U (t) + M(t) + E(t)] ≤ a1 + m1
δm
(65a)
From (4), we have:
dV (t)
dt
≤ (e1 + e3)U (t) − e2V (t).
This implies
lim sup
t→∞
V (t) ≤ (e1 + e3)(a1 + m1)
δe2
. (66a)
From (5), we have:
lim sup
t→∞
P(t) ≤ c1(a1 + m1)
δc2
(67a)
that proves our lemma.
Appendix 2: The Proof of Proposition 1
Let the function:
f (x) = γ3x3 + γ2x2 + γ1x + γ0.
From (27) we have f (0) = γ0 < 0 and f ′(x) = 0 has the roots xM , xm with
xM < 0, xm > 0. Therefore, for x ∈ [0, xm], f ′(x) < 0 and for x ∈ [xm,∞),
f ′(x) > 0. Thus, Eq. (26) has one root x10 ∈ [xm,∞). Moreover, it can be proved
that x10 ∈
(
α01
α11
,
β01
β11
)
.
Appendix 3: The Proof of Proposition 2
If E = 0, the characteristic Eq. (37) becomes:
λ5 + q34λ4 + (q13 + q23 + q33)λ3 + (q12 + q22 + q32)λ2
+ (q11 + q21 + q31)λ + q10 + q20 + q30 = 0.
(68)
From (39), we have q34 > 0, q13 +q23 +q33 > 0, q12 +q22 +q32 > 0, q11 +q21 +
q31 > 0, q10 + q20 + q30 > 0 and an algebraic manipulation yields to the inequalities
(40). Therefore, by using the Routh-Hurwitz criterion, we can say that all the roots of
equation (68) are either negative or have a negative real part. Thus, the proposition is
proved.
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Appendix 4: The Proof of Theorem 1
Eq. (41) does not have the root λ = 0, because q10 + q20 + q30 > 0. Assume that for
some expectation E1(d1), λ = iω(ω > 0) is a root of (41). Substituting λ = iω into
(41) and separating the real and imaginary parts, we have:
(
q10 + q20 − (q12 + q22)ω2
) ∫ ∞
0
k1(d1, s)cos(ωs)ds
+ ((q11 + q21)ω − (q13 + q23)ω3)
∫ ∞
0
k1(d1, s)sin(ωs)ds
= q32ω2 − q30 − q34ω4.
(69)
(
(q11 + q21)ω − (q13 + q23)ω3
) ∫ ∞
0
k1(d1, s)cos(ωs)ds
−
(
(q10 + q21 − (q12 + q22)ω2
) ∫ ∞
0
k(d1, s)sin(ωs)ds
= ω5 + q23ω3 − q21ω,
(70)
Adding sidewise after squaring the left and right sides of (69) and (70), we can
obtain the equations:
ω10 + r8ω8 + r6ω6 + r4ω4 + r2ω2 + r0 = 0, (71)
where
r8 = q234 + 2q33, r6 = q233 − (q13 + q23)2 − 2q31 − 2q32q34,
r0 = q230 − (q10 + q20)2,
r4 = q232 − (q12 + q22)2 + 2q34q30 − 2q31q33 + 2(q11 + q21)(q13 + q23),
r2 = q231 − (q11 + q21)2 − 2q32q30 + 2(q10 + q20)(q12 + q22).
(72)
Because r0 = q230 − (q10 + q20)2 < 0, then Eq. (71) has a positive root ω0 and
ω ∈ (0, ω0].
Appendix 5: The Proof of Theorem 3
If τ = 0, the characteristic equation (42) has the roots with negative real part. If
τ = τ0, Eq. (42) has a pair of conjugate purely imaginary roots ±iω0. If τ ∈ [0, τ0),
Eq. (42) has roots with negative real part. Thus, if τ ∈ [0, τ0), the equilibrium point
E0 is locally asymptotically stable.
Let denote the root of (45) by λ(τ) = μ(τ) + iω(τ), then we have:
μ(τ0) = 0, ω(τ0) = ω0.
If the transversal condition μ(τ0) = d
dτ
(Re(λ(τ )))|τ=τ0 = 0 is satisfied, then the
Hopf bifurcation occurs in the system (1)–(5) when τ = τ0.
By straight calculus we obtain (45).
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Thus if condition 2 of the theoremholds, theHopf bifurcation occurs as the transver-
sal condition holds.
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